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Cybersecurity is a critical issue as the world is moving towered IR4 era 
(Industrial Revaluation 4.0) where technology is involved, and access to the 
internet is an imperative need. The traditional computing systems are not able to 
meet the huge computing demand and growing data (Big-Data). Therefore; new 
technologies have been evolved such as cloud computing. This chapter is exploring 
the need for a dynamic access control approach to enhance the Cybersecurity. The 
scope in this chapter is focusing on IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) layer of cloud 
computing. The research approach aims to enhance the basic ABAC (Attribute-
Based Access Control) model by adding a context-aware feature and SoD principle. 
The enhanced model called ABACsh. This proposed enhancement is implemented 
through a framework based on AI (Artificial Intelligent) to meet the requirements 
of dynamic systems. The framework is tested in the OpenStack testbed. The results 
show better performance in the term of computation speed.
Keywords: Cybersecurity, AI, ABAC, formal logic, IaaS, cloud computing, 
OpenStack
1. Introduction
Industrial revolution 4 (IR 4.0) utilizes technology in different aspects. As per 
the world economic forum, three principle technology drivers in the industrial 
production: connectivity, intelligence and flexible automation where big data is one 
of the value drivers and IoT is one of the scale-ups enablers [1]. To summarize one 
scenario of the embedded technology in the industry is the implementation of IoT 
systems. Internet of Things (IoT) starts with a collection of sensors used to collect 
information from the surrounded environment. For example, a temperature sensor 
used to collect the atmosphere temperature during the day by taking three reads 
for six months for the purpose of studying climate change. The collected data will 
be sent to central storage such as cloud computing technology to get the advantage 
of accessing the data anywhere and anytime. There is a need for a network con-
nective that allows distributed components to be connected. Mostly the collected 
data is a type of big-date as they might collect temperature reading from a different 
site in the globe and for a long time might be years. That big-data requires some 
analysis where the traditional analytical system might not manage to absorb its huge 
records, therefore; there is a need to utilize the features of artificial intelligence filed 
in data-science. This example shows how several technologies are used in order to 
be used in analyzing the big-data collected from different sites.
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As there are distributed systems and the internet connection is used, cyberse-
curity becomes a critical aspect, especially when there are some economic benefits. 
There are many security principles which might be tackled in order to enhance the 
cybersecurity of the systems, however, access control is one of the major aspects 
as there will be a need to restrict the access to the system as there is a distributed 
environment when it comes to IoT deployment. One of the optimal access control 
models to be used in this case is attribute-based access control model (ABAC) [1, 2].
This chapter introduces intelligent attribute-based access control model tested 
in the cloud computing environment. Section 2 discusses the introduced enhance-
ments to the basic ABAC model. Section 3 illustrates how inelegant is introduced in 
the proposed ABAC. Finally, an empirical experiment is demonstrated in Section 
4 where OpenStack (cloud environment) is used to discuss the efficiency of the 
proposed approach.
2. The proposed enhancement in ABAC model
2.1 Context-aware analytical study
Context-aware system has verity of definitions based on the study scope. In 
access control field, context-aware allowing a dynamic permission to access an 
object based on some attributes related to the user context [3]. The context can 
be extracted from the system environment by using 5W1H (who, where, what, 
why, when and how) [4]. The context attributes are a finite set which reflect the 
system and differs from the attributes related to the subject and the object as per the 
researcher in [5]. However, other authors consider the rule enforcement through 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is based on the attributes of both the 
subject and the object [6]. Therefore; this section is investigating context-aware 
concept in access control.
An ubiquitous application with RBAC extension has been investigated by Kim’s 
[3] where state checking matrix is used to build a context-aware agent. Two cases 
are defined to deploy context-awareness. The first one is through giving privilege 
up-on the user context, such as location and time. The second one is changing 
resource permissions up-on the system information, such as network bandwidth 
and memory usage. Another work proposed by Kim in this filed, called CIAAC 
(Context Information-based Application Access Control) [4]. CIAAC designed to 
separate processing logic and business from context awareness and access control 
policy. CIAAC add flexibility to business application which support dynamic 
access control policy. This feature allows to satisfy the demand of external security 
environment. However, the potential drawbacks of CIAAC have not yet been evalu-
ated. Another technique was proposed by Li in his thesis [7] to meet the scope of 
mobile cloud environment based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). Li defines 
context-aware terminology to cover the user context-information in addition to the 
environment such as location and time.
As per the literature, encryption techniques such as ABE introduce several 
limitations which effect the overall system efficiency such as the overhead caused 
by bilinear pairing due to its heavy computation [8]. In addition to that ABE cannot 
attain fine-grained control [9]. Another related work done by AL Kukhun [10] 
considering pervasive systems where XACML language is used to build a model to 
extend RBAC that can facilitate context-aware features. However, RBAC extinc-
tions approaches do not satisfy usability, situation awareness, and improving access 
opportunities. It can be observed that location and time are used as context-aware 
parameters in most related work on context-aware access control models. Liu and 
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Wang [11] present the Fine-grained Context-aware Access (FCAC) model for 
Health Care and Life Sciences (HCLS) using specific communication technology 
based on linked data. FCAC is based on two main components: an ontology base, 
and access policy with XACML.
It is observed from the state of art that context attributes are linked to 
the system environment rather than subject-attributes or object-attributes. 
Venkatasubramanian et al. [12] investigate context-aware to distinguish between 
the traditional authorization models and their proposed criticality-aware as they 
take into consideration the context of the whole system. Their criticality-aware 
(CAAC) is based on RBAC concepts. Choi [13] used access-aware in cloud comput-
ing. Choi recommends an ontology-based Access Control Model (onto-ACM). 
Compared to C-RBAC (Context-aware RBAC), onto-ACM can grant the role 
inheritance by administrator and user, whereas C-RBAC grants the role by adminis-
trator only.
2.2 The proposed context-aware deployment in ABACsh
As per the related work investigated in Section 2.1, we can conclude that to 
deploy an efficient context-ware feature, the attributes should be related to the 
system environment. Context-aware will add a flexibility to dynamic systems where 
the users and privileges keep changing such as the case in IaaS. ABAC is the basic 
access control type which can support the context-awareness. Therefore, we are not 
recommending RBAX extensions.
The proposed ABACsh model is adding context-aware through two phases. 
The first phase defines the context-attribute set. Each context-attribute consists 
of an attribute name and an attribute value. The context attributes-names set is 
predefined by the system administrator based on system critical information and 
characteristics. Context-attributes differ from the environment attributes in that 
the latter values are predefined by the administrator, whereas context-attribute 
values are updated based on the system states, where an embedded sensor captures 
the context information. For example, for the context-aware attribute named 
memory, its value will be updated based on the system memory measurements. 
The context attribute can reflect CPU clock, desk space, network zone, or data and 
time. In the second phase, context-awareness will be defined as one of the configu-
ration points in the proposed ABACsh system to enforce the use of context in the 
access-control decision.
2.3 Critical analysis of SoD in ABAC
In an environment that allows policy combination, a user is authorized to act 
in more than one role or trigger more than one operation simultaneously. Policy 
combination might lead to policy conflict, as some actions violate the overall policy 
if they are committed at the same time. Therefore, constraints should be configured 
to manage this possibility.
The Separation of Duty (SoD) principle is used in such scenarios to prevent 
misuse of the system by limiting the user to the least privilege necessary to perform 
their required tasks. The least privilege principle limits the access of the subject 
during an operation on a specific task to be within the minimum resources, lowest 
privileges, and specified period of time. Several security enhancements can be 
gained from SoD, such as fraud prevention and error minimization [14–16].
There are two main types of SoD: static, and dynamic. Static-SoD (SSoD) 
will list the conflicting roles which cannot be executed by the same user at the 
same time, whereas dynamic-SoD (DSoD) enforces the control at the time of 
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access-request. In an RBAC model, roles and role relations are defined in advance 
during the policy engineering process. For SSoD in RBAC, SSoD relations place con-
straints on the user-to-rule assignment function, where one user can be assigned 
a specific set of roles and be excluded from another set of roles. Otherwise, two or 
more users are required to be involved in accomplishing sensitive tasks, since it is 
less likely that multiple parties will issue a fraud attack. In the DSoD relation, the 
capabilities for one user are restricted to being activated during a specific user ses-
sion, i.e. the same user cannot perform two roles simultaneously [17, 18].
Although in RBAC, SSoD and DSoD relations offer some advancement in 
control over identity-based systems, security issues remain. The most accommodat-
ing form of SoD is History based (HSoD). Although, enforcing it in a static based 
access control management environment such as RBAC is di_cult, if not impossible 
[19, 20]. One role of a HSoD is that it prevents an object from being accessed by the 
same subject a certain number of times [21]. Therefore, we assume that the ABAC 
model concept has the characteristics of supporting certain types of SoD. The fol-
lowing section will investigate efforts in the literature to involve the SoD principle 
in ABAC.
A significant amount of research has been conducted regarding the principle of 
Separation of Duty (SoD) in RBAC; however, SoD deployment in ABAC remains a 
problem [22]. One of the earliest related works in specifying constraints in ABAC 
is illustrated through ABAC configuration-points [5]. Nevertheless, their proposed 
constraint settings are event-specific during attribute assignment and/or modifica-
tion of the object and subject. This method is similar to the RBAC constraints-
setting concept, where the allowed roles are activated for a specific user session 
after the roles are assigned to the users.
The author of ABCL proposed an event-independent constraint language based 
on conflicting relations of attribute values such as mutual exclusion and precondi-
tion [23]. ABCL language specifies restrictions either on a single set of attribute 
values or on a set of values of different attributes within the same entity. The 
usefulness of ABCL language has been validated through case studies. However, it 
lacks a framework or a formal model that illustrates its implementation. Dynamic 
Separation of Duties (DSoD) is more appropriate to cloud computing, and it 
also meets the dynamic nature of ABAC. Nguyen [24] has carried out interesting 
research on DSoD and proposed DSoD deployment through Provenance based 
Access Control (PBAC). His work is basically proposing a means to capture and 
utilize the information needed in the SoD enforcement, as previous work in the 
area assumes that the information is ready without demonstrating how to prepare 
it. Some of the previous work related to dynamic-based SoD is ObjDSoD, which is 
based on the object, and where the enforcement is constructed on a set consisting 
of conflicting-roles and a conicting-action on these roles. Therefore, the subject 
will not be allowed to perform an action on an object if that action is in the set of 
action role conflict. Another approach is OpsDSoD based on operations. This is a 
task-aware that involves an action-role conflict set, thus it differs from ObjDSoD 
by limiting the user to perform the needed actions for a particle task even though 
they have more privileges. A third approach is HDSoD, which combines ObjDSoD 
and OpsDSoD. Further, HDSoD is object-aware and a task aware. HDSoD is order-
aware, where order-dependency conflict is triggered if the order is essential for a 
sequence of sub-tasks. Nguyen in [24] extended HDSoD by adding dependence-
path-aware and past attribute-aware in their DSoD which is used in Provenance-
based Access Control (PBAC).
Event pattern and response relations called obligations are introduced by 
Ferraiolo, Atluri, and Gavrila in their policy machine research [19], which can 
enforce some forms of HSoD in their access control framework. Obligations have 
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a set of conditions that are specified by the event pattern under which the state of 
the policy is obligated to change; only if this set matches the surrounding context, 
the operation on an object can be executed. There are two recognized standards 
can be applied to the ABAC concept: Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML), and Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) [25]. XACML does not 
show any support for DSoD constraint, while NGAC does show some support to 
DSoD through a Prohibitions (Denies)-relation, which includes a set of deny-
ing relations that specify privilege exceptions where a user that is allowed to run 
capability (x) will be prohibited from running capability (y).
2.4 SoD design and deployment in access control system
It is most likely that the formulation of SoD requirements are prepared by the 
administrator based on the business rules. An example of such a rule is, person may 
not approve his or her own purchase order [26]. SoD deployment can be involved 
with different layers of an access control system. It can be designed within admin-
istrative-level policies and procedures, or it can be used within logical or technical 
mechanism access-control restriction points [15].
Based on recommendations regarding SoD implementation to traverse its limita-
tion in RBAC [20], several techniques have been explored, such as grouping con-
cept, membership control, activation control, history control, and labels. However, 
in ABAC, the grouping concept will not be appropriate as grouping restricts an 
attributes flexible nature. Membership control cannot be adopted by ABAC as it is 
not role-centric. Though, the activation control concept has been adopted into SoD 
specifications in ABAC by Jin [5] and Bijon [23]. Ferraiolo et al. [19] describe a rela-
tion between entities that can be used in History based SoD deployment. Whereas 
Biswas et al. [27] point out that label concept can be used to enforce SoD in their 
proposed label-based access control in an ABAC. There are several obstacles in 
designing and implementing SoD, as it is an application-oriented policy where the 
business rules indicate the critical tasks which require SoD enforcement. Another 
challenge is that different applications may require various types of SoD. Lastly, 
most SoD types are informally defined, which creates ambiguity regarding the 
subjects or specifications [28].
2.5 The proposed SoD deployment in IaaS by ABACsh
Based on the above investigation [22–24, 29], SoD can be defined as an 
enforcement constraint configured to avoid conflict between policies. This 
conflict can be due to multi-access requests from different subjects to the same 
resource simultaneously, or the same subject requesting access to multiple 
resources at the same time. From this definition, it can be observed that SoD 
may be viewed as object-operation-oriented, which can be aligned with ABAC’s 
relation between appropriate to enhance SoD by implementing a form of HSoD 
which will be suitable to be enforced in a dynamic access control policy environ-
ment such as ABAC. With RBAC, the centric entity involved in the SoD principle 
design is the role set. In contrast, ABAC cannot consider a role in the form of an 
attribute as it can lead to a chaos [30]. Therefore, the focus of this paper regard-
ing formally defining SoD within ABAC will be on attributes and attribute-rela-
tions, with no aim to define an application-oriented SoD. Thus, we aim to identify 
a logical based design for SoD within the ABAC policy model. The proposed work 
is based on formal logic; exception cases are not encouraged in a formal logic 
as exceptions make regulations non-monotonic and introduce conflict between 
proven conclusions [31].
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Therefore, the proposed SoD is operation-object orientated that defines a rules-
set reflecting the forbidden operations on the set of objects under a specific situa-
tion of a collection of entities attributes. Entities include the object, the subject, the 
environment, and the system context. Moreover, formal logic facilitates SoD rule 
creation, even by non-expert security administrators. Since the proposed system 
is attribute-based, it is not necessary to update different locations if a new action 
restriction is added, deleted, or modified. Object-attributes and operations. We can 
discern from the above that it is more appropriate to enhance SoD by implementing 
a form of HSoD which will be suitable to be enforced in a dynamic access control 
policy environment such as ABAC. With RBAC, the centric entity involved in the 
SoD principle design is the role set. In contrast, ABAC cannot consider a role in 
the form of an attribute as it can lead to a chaos [30]. Therefore, the focus of this 
paper regarding formally defining SoD within ABAC will be on attributes and 
attribute-relations, with no aim to define an application-oriented SoD. Thus, we 
aim to identify a logical based design for SoD within the ABAC policy model. The 
proposed work is based on formal logic; exception cases are not encouraged in a 
formal logic as exceptions make regulations non-monotonic and introduce conflict 
between proven conclusions [31]. Therefore, the proposed SoD is operation-object 
orientated that defines a rules-set rejecting the forbidden operations on the set 
of objects under a specific situation of a collection of entities attributes. Entities 
include the object, the subject, the environment, and the system context. Moreover, 
formal logic facilitates SoD rule creation, even by non-expert security administra-
tors. Since the proposed system is attribute-based, it is not necessary to update 
different locations if a new action restriction is added, deleted, or modified.
3. An intelligent framework for ABACsh
The framework is designed based on knowledge-agent and it employs rule-based 
expert system method. This intelligent system is not based on machine learn-
ing which will have a percentage of correct answers. This system is based on the 
available rules; therefore, it is not a type of uncertain approach. The system must 
guarantee an access decision.
The purpose of this ABACsh framework is to prove that AI architecture can con-
tribute in supporting a dynamic access control. In regard to guaranteeing behavior, 
the followed mechanism in this chapter is based on knowledge available. If there 
is a shortage in knowledge, the access decision will be denied. There are other AI 
categories related to uncertain knowledge such as probabilistic reasoning, However, 
uncertain reasoning is out of this research scope.
3.1 AI scope for the proposed framework
According to [32–34], artificial intelligence systems are designed to think and 
act. They can be categorized into four types based on the intention of the system: 
Thinking Humanly, Acting Humanly, Thinking Rationally and Acting Rationally. 
The category of Thinking Rationally leads to an evolved need for the logic field in 
artificial intelligence. Involving logic in an intelligent system faces two substantial 
obstacles. The first one is the difficulty of presenting informal-knowledge using a 
formal logical notation though the certainty level is less than 100%. The second is 
that solving problems theoretically is different from solving them practically when 
the machine capacity is taken into consideration.
The category of Acting Rationally initiates the development of a computer 
agent. Prior to computer science, the term agent was used in different fields. 
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Therefore, there are various definitions of agent. However, it can be defined as an 
entity that acts within an environment by sensing its surroundings to update its 
knowledge and acts upon that to meet specific goals [35]. The agent function repre-
sents an abstract mathematical description, whereas the agent program represents 
an agent implementation within a physical system.
Problem-solving through an intelligent agent involves four stages. Firstly, the 
agent formulates its goal. Secondly, it formulates the problem based on five steps: 
initial state, possible actions, transition model that describes what each action does, 
goal test and path cost. Thirdly, it searches for a solution by looking for a sequence 
of actions that leads to the goal. Fourthly, in the execution stage, the solution found 
is implemented. However, the problem-solving agent is inflexible as each possible 
state should be hard-coded. Therefore, the complexity of the search stage grows 
exponentially in relation to the number of states in addition to its inability to infer 
unobserved information. Therefore, there is a need for logic to reason about the 
possible states instead of hard-coded all predicted states.
Knowledge-based reasoning is a step in overcoming problem-solving agent 
limitations. The logic provides a natural language for describing and reasoning 
about the system. The knowledge-based system is given facts about the external 
world, and it is asked queries about that world. The rule-based expert system is 
a popular method that is used to build knowledge-based systems. The rules are 
used to represent knowledge in the format of IF-THEN. The Inference engine is the 
reasoning component whereby the system concludes by linking the rules given in 
the knowledge base with facts supplied from the database. The explanation facilities 
allow the user to interact with the expert system to get justifications regarding the 
results produced by the inference engine. Therefore; the AI scope for the proposed 
intelligent-framework for ABACsh is illustrated in Figure 1. Modal logic is found to 
be the most appropriate logic to be used in AI as discussed by [36].
3.2 Logical-based agent architecture
Intelligence security is a fertile approach, as most existing security paradigms 
suffer from reactive and fragmented approaches [37]. In a frequently changing 
infrastructure, deploying an agent-based mechanism will be an advantage [38]. 
Figure 1. 
AI scope for the proposed framework.
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Modal logic is a candidate that supports a logical approach in artificial intelligence 
systems [39]. The main component of a knowledge-agent is a Knowledge-Base (KB) 
that consists of a set of sentences expressed using formal logic, in addition to two 
generic functions that involve logical inference. The first function is known as TELL, 
and adds new sentences (facts) to the KB to provide it with the required information. 
The second function is known as ASK, and queries the known information from the 
KB to determine the next step. The process between TELL and ASK will end as soon 
as the desired action is selected. The interaction between these two generic functions 
is similar to the updating and querying in databases, as illustrated in Figure 2. When 
an agent program is called upon, it performs two main actions. Firstly, it will TELL 
the KB what it perceives. Secondly, it ASKs the KB what action should be taken.
Therefore, agent-based architecture is suitable to represent an ABAC model. The 
logical agent, furthermore, will be appropriate for the proposed modal logic scheme. 
Table 1 demonstrates how knowledge-based agent architecture can represent an ABAC 
system. The logical agent can be designed to represent an access-request state through 
a process of inference to derive a new representation of the access-request state that 
can be used to deduce required actions. The proposed access-control logic agent will be 
founded on knowledge-based agents, as this type of agent is logic-based [34].
3.3 ABACsh conceptual requirement
Based on the analysis and investigations addressed an analytical study published 
by this chapter author in [40], the critical requirements in designing an ABAC 
model are listed below.
• Req.1 ABAC model definition requires to identify the configuration points. 
Each point should be formalized via the proper languages. The configuration 
point indicates the necessary configurations to be accomplished via the ABAC 
model processing for computing the access decision. These points are known as 
functional points. It is more convenient to minimize the number of configura-
tion points as they affect the system’s computational complexity.
• Req.2 ABAC is identity-free. Therefore, identifications such as subject-id are 
not the main elements in access-decision processing.
• Req.3 Avoid the creation of lists or groups in the design, as ABAC is intended to 
be flexible and able to cope with large enterprises.
• Req.4 Context-attributes reflect the current system state, whereas environment 
attributes reflect the fixed system characteristics.
• Req.5 ABAC is a multi-factor decision. Therefore, it enables fine-grained access
• Req.6 There are no predefined privileges for subjects as the privileges are 
computed after an access request is triggered. Policy rules set in ABAC are 
specified based on attributes. As a result, the permissible operations will be 
defined upon access-request.
• Req.7 The two basic functionalities in ABAC are attribute-assignment and 
rules-creation.
• Req.8 Security principles such as Separation of Duty (SoD) must be enforced.
9
An Intelligent Access Control Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95459
The enhanced attribute-based access control ABACsh fulfills requirement Req.1 by 
employing one main configuration point that is ABAC agent. This agent takes as an 
input, the access request parameters which consist of the subject, the object, and the 
operation (s, o, opr). Then it returns the access decision that indicates if the subject is 
allowed to operate on the object or it is denied. Compared to ABACα , which has four 
configuration points, the policy configuration here is reduced to one, as the prolifera-
tion of policy configuration points can introduce difficulties in policy expression and 
comprehension [5]. For Req.2, in the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the decision-
making process considers the subject attributes in addition to other attributes, instead 
of depending solely on the subject identity information. In Req.3, grouping is studied 
by HGABAC [41] to facilitate the addition of a hierarchy feature to ABAC.
However, grouping and listing will impede the flexible nature of ABAC [30, 42]. 
Therefore, permissions grouping and listing are avoided in this ABACsh. The decision 
calculation is based on four sets of attributes: subject-attributes, object-attributes, 
environment-attributes, and system-context attributes, all of which are taken into 
consideration in the proposed design to meet requirement Req.4. System context 
attributes have a special sensor to obtain an up to date system state to meet require-
ment Req.5. The privilege decision is calculated based on the attributes relation defined 
in the policy-rules. Therefore; the privilege value is returned after the access-decision 
is triggered, which meets the requirement Req.6. There are two core functions of 
ABACsh. The first function takes place at the initial system stage, where the attri-
bute pairs (name:value) are created for the defined access control system entities 
Components Agent architecture ABAC requirements
knowledge 
base(KB)
Background sentences Predefined sets of entities, attributes and 
policy rules
To represent action(s) The action is access-decision
inference 
system
Infer (i.e arrive to a conclusion via 
reasoning) hidden properties of the 
world to add new sentence to KB
New sentences are added each time an 
access-request is triggered which consist of 
a combination of attributes with the request 
operation
Infer based on the predefined 
sentences and the new ones to 
conclude with appropriate actions
Reasoning based on the attributes set and 
the policy rule-sets to conclude with an 
appropriate action (allow or deny) the 
access-request
Table 1. 
Mapping knowledge-based agent with ABAC requirements.
Figure 2. 
A generic knowledge-based agent function [34].
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(subject, object, environment, and context). The second function is rules creation, 
which represents the SoD-rules and Policy-rules in the form of capability which 
indicates the access-rights. These two functions meet the ABAC requirement Req.7. 
An initial SoD is introduced in this design in the type of a DSoD. The elimination of 
policy-rule conflicts can be achieved by an object-operation oriented constraint. A 
formal presentation of the proposed SoD enforcement sentences is defined and will 
be flexible to manage the set of constraints and meet the system requirements Req.8 
since the administrator can modify the set of SoD sentences. The proposed SoD will be 
enforced after the access-request is triggered where an action is forbidden based on a 
collection of attributes.
3.4 The proposed framework
The proposed intelligent framework for ABACsh has been published by this 
chapter author in [40]. Figure 3 shows the framework components. The proposed 
ABACsh model framework focuses on three functional points in Ref. to XACML 
framework: PDP, PIP and PAP. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforces 
the access decision. The PDP (Policy Decision Point) involves the core logical 
reasoning that takes place in an inference mechanism where the access decision 
is processed. The PAP (Policy Administration Point) involves rule creation by the 
system administrators. The PIP (Policy Information Point) involves information 
collection.
4. ABACsh implementation for IaaS cloud via OpenStack
This section demonstrates the visibility of ABACsh in IaaS cloud by introducing 
an enforcement architecture based on OpenStack. That is followed by a prototype 
implementation and performance evaluation that illustrates the advantages of the 
proposed ABACsh extension over the existing access control model. This section 
discuss the following points
• Designing enforcement architecture for ABACsh that utilizes telemeter 
service deployment to be used in feeding Policy Information Point (PIP) with 
attributes values.
Figure 3. 
The proposed intelligent framework for ABACsh.
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• A prototype implementation of an extended nova access control model with an 
intelligent ABAC.
 ○ Extend the nova policy enforcement point (PEP) to communicate with an 
external policy engine
 ○ The proposed external policy-engine works as policy decision point (PDP)
• The introduced PDP follows ABACsh by
 ○ Utilizing the attributes in access decision-making process.
 ○ Involving forward-chaining algorithm that works as logical reasoning for 
access decision processing.
• Three experiments are studied to compare and contrast the extended ABACsh 
with the default nova-OpenStack access control model.
• The Quality of Service (QoS) measurement is discussed based on response 
time as a performance metric.
5. OpenStack access control model (OSAC)
A key component in building a virtualization environment is its operation 
via the hypervisor. The hypervisor on its own cannot build IaaS. Therefore, a 
cloudstack such as OpenStack, Cloud-Stack or OpenNebul is required. According 
to the current industry, OpenStack is likely to become a dominant cloud-stack 
[43]. OpenStack is an open-source cloud computing platform that offers an IaaS 
layer of service. OpenStack IaaS infrastructure supports agent communication. 
For example, network nodes in the OpenStack activate a DHCP agent to deploy a 
DHCP service [44]. OpenStack was selected to be the experimental platform for this 
research as it has a supportive and active community of both academic researchers 
and commercial bodies.
OpenStack can deploy different access control models within its infrastruc-
ture [45]. For example, nova configuration files can be protected via several 
implementations such as centralized logging, policy file (policy.json) and MAC 
framework (Mandatory Access Control). The availability of access control models 
depends on the hypervisor vendor. The supported models are Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), and Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC).
The Openstack access control model (OSAC) that enables both operators and 
users to access resources for specific services is a type of RBAC [46]. The keystone 
[47] supports the notation of roles and groups. Each user should be associated 
with a group, and each group has a list of roles. For a user to be granted access to 
a service, Openstack service takes into consideration his/her role, though as the 
first authorization step, the OpenStack PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) takes into 
consideration the policy rules associated with the resources before it checks the user 
role. Therefore, the policy enforcement middleware enables fine-grained access. 
Each Openstack service defines the access control policies rules for its resources in a 
specific policy file called policy.json.
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5.1 Policy engine
Policy engine in OpenStack is a type of authorization engine that return 
back a decision based on some policy rules that indicating if a specific opera-
tion is allowed or denied [14, 45, 48]. The default policy engine is maintained 
via Oslo policy, and the access request is issued via API communication. Oslo 
policy is completely separated from RBAC model [49]. The developer can view 
Oslo policy rules that are related to nova via the command “oslopolicy-policy-
generator {namespace nova”. The list of rules verifies if the user credentials are 
matching to grant access to the requested resources. The user credentials are 
stored in the format of a token. The token holds information related to the token 
itself in addition to the user, the project, the domain, the role, the service and 
the endpoint. The policy rules are stored in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) 
file format.
In policy.json, the access policy consists of two main parts “<target>”: 
“<rule>” [47] . The target is known as an action that indicates the API call for an 
operation such as “start an instance”. The rules can be one of the following: allow 
all, deny all, a special check, a comparison of two values, Boolean expressions based 
on simpler rules. The special check gives the developers an opportunity to extend 
the OpenStack policy engine. The special check can indicate, a role that is extracted 
from token information, or a complex rule by defining an alias, or a target URL that 
delegates the check to an external policy engine.
5.2 Nova authorisation data-flow
Each service in Openstack has its own access control configuration points 
which involve PEP, PIP, PDP and PAP. The information ow between nova 
access-control configuration points is demonstrated in Figure 4. In the original 
Openstack architecture, Nova PEP will send a token that contains the informa-
tion of the access request to Nova PIP to retrieve the object information. Then 
Nova PEP sends the information of the subject, object and request to Nova PDP 
in order for Nova PDP request an access control policy from Nova PAP. Nova PDP 
evaluate the access request based on the policy and return the access decision to 
Nova PEP.
5.3 Forward-chaining algorithm
In the search stage of the problem-solving agent, there is a need to use a proper 
searching algorithm that meets the problem scenario and the input information. 
The search algorithms that are used in rule-based systems are backward chain-
ing, forward-chaining and a mixture of both of them [34, 51]. Table 2 compares 
between the reasoning algorithms which are referred to as chaining in some 
literature.
Many researchers avoid the Logic Theory Machine, which is based on forward-
reasoning due to the computation complexity. However, this complexity is due to 
the classical mathematical logic and it is not due to the forward-reasoning concept 
[52]. Classical mathematical logic such as propositional logic and First-order logic. 
Therefore, the computational complexity of forward-chaining when it is used in 
nonclassical logic such as deontic logic will be decidable, and it will have an accept-
able computation complexity. A simple algorithm for forward-chaining is illus-
trated in Figure 5. Forward reasoning search iteration is based on facts and rules to 
find a conclusion.
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5.4 ABAC implementation in OpenStack
5.4.1 Enforcement architecture
The core characteristics of ABACsh are to work as an intelligent agent that sense 
the attributes (the environment, the system context, the subject and the object) in 
order to search for an access decision using forward chaining (forward-reasoning). 
The set of attributes represent facts whereas the set of policy rules represent the 
rules.
Forward-chaining Backward-chaining
Known as Forward reasoning (Data driven) Backward reasoning (Goal driven)
Reasoning start 
with
A Set of facts to reach a goal (or 
hypothesis)
A hypothesis (goal) to reach the facts 
behind it
When applicable If the goal is unknown If the set of goals are known
Table 2. 
Comparing forward-chaining with backward-chaining.
Figure 4. 
Nova authorization data- flow [50].
Figure 5. 
Forward chaining algorithm.
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The proposed ABACsh enforcement architecture employs the Telemetry service 
of OpenStack. The telemetry service in Openstack provides the facility to sense the 
IaaS cloud for environment attributes and the context attributes. The Telemetry ser-
vice facilitates polling information from the computing service since the proposed 
access control agent ABACsh will use the collected information for the attributes 
assignment process. As an example, the nova service access control process will 
be used to illustrate ABACsh extension. Section 4.3 introduces the default data 
ow of nova service access control while Figure 6 illustrates nova service access 
control with ABACsh extension. The proposed ABACsh enforcement architecture 
focuses on three configuration points: PIP (Policy Information Point), PAP (Policy 
Admission Point) and PDP (Policy Decision Point). ABACsh enforcement architec-
ture is divided into three components as follows:
1. ABACsh PIP: this is used to collect attributes information from the access 
control entities, the environment, and the system context. PIP can be achieved 
in Openstack through configuring the Telemetry component. The Telemetry 
service is designed to support a billing system by gathering the required 
information. Therefore, its structure will be beneficial in providing PIP with 
required attribute information. Telemetry consists of five building blocks: 
Compute Agent, Central Agent, Collector, Data Store and API Server in order 
to perform five essential functions [53]. Figure 7 summarizes the Telemeter 
process to collect data for further analysis. Telemeter can be configured to 
collect the attributes and save them in JSON file as this file format is used to 
store policy rules in OpenStack
2. ABACsh PAP: The knowledge database for ABACsh model consists of access 
rules from SoD rules and Policy rules. The access rules are created by the 
system administrator. Those rules will be stored in JSON file format to 
facilitate its implementation in OpenStack.
3. ABACsh PDP: this is the logical component which reasons about access control 
in ABACsh. ABACsh PDP will get an access-request sentence from ABACsh PEP 
that consist of the attributes information with the access request. ABACsh PDP 
will load the access rules from ABACsh PAP. ABACsh PDP accomplishes logical 
reasoning through forward-chaining algorithm. The result of the logical 
 reasoning indicates if the access is permitted or denied.
5.4.2 Prototype implementation
The first stage of ABACsh deployment in Openstack is to be implemented on 
nova component. ABACsh PDP part will be implemented as a prototype.
• Scope and Assumption.
IaaS access control tenant scope can be a single tenant [5], multi-tenant 
[54–56] and collaborating parties a cross-clouds [57, 58]. The implementa-
tion scope of access control in this chapter is within single tenant whereas its 
hypothesis is applicable to multi-tenant and cross-clouds as the big concept 
behind ABACsh is user-id free and attributes-based. The proposed ABACsh 
is not replacing OpenStack RBAC in this stage. Instead, it allows fine-grained 
access control and opens prospective avenues to replace RBAC in the near 
feature.
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• OpenStack Testbed.
OpenStack aids in deploying IaaS cloud. Figure 8 shows the deployed testbed 
in this chapter. It is installed in three machines using Ubuntu 16.04 LTS as 
an operating system and OpenStack Ocata the latest release (Feb2017). One 
machine is configured as a controller which provides OpenStack main server 
in addition to networking services (neutron), keystone, nova and glance. The 
Two other machines are configured as compute nodes where virtual machines 
are hosted. The machines specification is Intel Core i5–4460 CPU Processor 
3.20GHz _ 4, 15.5 GiB memory, 235 GB Disk and 2 NICs cards. The testbed 
networking consists of two LANs: management network and data network. 
The management network traffics the Openstack service communication 
where data network connects the communication of the virtual machine. This 
IaaS is a private cloud where OpenStack services and the VMs are accessed by 
the LAN users.
• Data flow.
Nova policy engine is embedded within its configuration files, therefore it is 
considered as one of OpenStack’s limitations. However, the default policies can 
be overwritten if policy.json is enabled. Policy.json can be configured to call an 
external policy engine through URL. The token hold information that can be 
passed from OpenStack keystone to ABACsh policy engine via RESET GET-call. 
Nova PEP receives an access decision from ABACsh policy engine via RESET 
POST-call. ABACsh policy engine use a forward-chaining algorithm to produce 
an access control decision. The access control reasoning takes facts which are 
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Based on access rules defined by the administrator, the access request will be 
allowed or denied. Figure 9 shows the ABACsh PDP extension to nova autho-
rization. A policy engine is designed and implemented to add an access control 
enforcement based on attributes.
In access control terminology, the Openstack users are the subject, the nova 
resources are the objects, the policy.json is PEP and ABACsh policy engine is the 
PDP. The attributes are extracted from the following channels
• The subject attributes can be extracted from keystone token where the avail-
able information is user name, user id, user passward, role id, role name. The 
Token information can be retrieved from “content-type:application/json’ 
‘through curl command.
• The extracted nova metrics from the OpenStack system via a command 
openstack quota show are considered as the object attributes. The attributes 
information is stored in JSON _le format
• The nova environment attributes are extracted via the OpenStack command 
openstack hypervisor stats show. The attributes information is stored in 
JSON _le format
• The context attributes are not implemented in this prototype but it is visible to 
be included via Telemetry OpenStack service
ABACsh policy engine server is implemented using several programming tech-
nologies. The web server is developed using Python programming language 
with web.py since OpenStack services is using python. RESETful API utilities 
are used to allow the communication between ABACsh and OpenStack APIs. 
The forward reasoning function is programmed using java since this program-
ming language can be smoothly integrated into web programming. To allow the 
technical interaction between python and java, jpype is used [59, 60]. Data is 
stored in JSON file formats such as policy data and attributes data.
5.4.3 Performance evaluation
The aim of this performance evaluation is to detect if ABACsh deployment in 
Openstack introduces any significant overhead. The efficiency of deploying an access 
control model depends on several factors. The quality of service (QoS) measures 
Figure 8. 
OpenStack testbed in physical machines.
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can be calculated by performance properties and computation complexity [61, 62]. 
In this section, the performance metrics are evaluated. The performance metrics 
consist of four elements: response time, policy repository and retrieval, policy dis-
tribution, and Integrated with authentication function [62]. Table 3 explains theses 
performance metrics elements and on which access control components they can be 
applied. Since the implemented prototype is the ABACsh PDP, the followed experi-
ments will measure response time. With regard to policy repository and retrieval, the 
implemented ABACsh use JSON file to store access control policy which does not add 
any extra hardware or software cost to OpenStack IaaS cloud as this form of policy 
storage is used by OpenStack. The remaining two performance metrics elements are 
not calculated in this stage as PIP is not implemented.
5.4.4 Experiment content
In this section, the performance evaluation of the implemented ABACsh pro-
totype in OpenStack is presented. Specifically, ABACsh policy engine which repre-
sents PDP of access control model is discussed. The experiments fall into three parts 
where the response time is calculated. Response time indicates the time consumed 
by the system in order to process the access request decision call. The response time 
has been used to measure the performance in several OpenStack implementations 
such as in [63, 64]. In these experiments, OpenStack cloud was installed in physical 
servers running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS release. Three types of execution time can be 
measured [65, 66]. The first one is real time that reflects the wall clock where the 
time is calculated from the start till the end of the call including the waiting time 
and time used by other processes. The second one is user-time that reflects the 
actual CPU-time spent outside the kernel during the process call in user-mode with-
out considering other processes. The third one is sys-time that reflects the actual 
CPU-time spent within the kernel during the process execution.
Three experimental settings have been implemented as explained below.
• Experiment 1 (Exp1): The response time for the default access control model to 
process access request to nova resources. The default use RBAC and Oslo policy 
engine.
• Experiment 2 (Exp2): The response time for extending the default nova policy 
engine with ABACsh that utilizes 24 attributes in access control processing
• Experiment 3 (Exp3): The response time for extending the default nova policy 
engine with ABACsh that use forward-chaining for access control reasoning.
Figure 9. 
The prototype implementation data flow.
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5.4.5 Experimental results and discussion
Each experiment was run five times, and then the average value was recorded. 
Five scenarios were observed by increasing the number of requests from five to 
twenty-five as illustrated in Table 4. The request indicates an access control request 
from a user (subject) to access nova-resources (object).
Based on usability engineering [67, 68] The response time value can be within 
three categories: over 0.1 seconds will give the user a feeling that the system is 
reacting instantaneously, over 1.0 seconds will give the user a feeling of a delay but 
No. of Requests Response time Exp1 Exp2 Exp3
5 Real 8.67 8.96 8.77
User 5.56 5.52 5.55
System 0.42 0.44 0.40
10 Real 17.24 17.34 17.24
User 10.99 11.05 11.11
System 0.88 0.86 0.83
15 Real 25.52 26.08 25.87
User 16.46 16.61 16.64
System 1.25 1.31 1.22
20 Real 34.40 34.56 34.45
User 22.07 22.17 22.23
System 1.68 1.66 1.56
25 Real 43.02 43.05 43.07
User 27.64 27.63 27.82
System 2.09 2.10 1.96
Table 4. 
Experimental results.
Performance metrics element Description The applicable 
Access Control 
Component
Response time The time required to process 
access request should meet the 
organization requirement
PEP, PDP, PIP, 
PRP
Policy distribution If there exist a mechanism that 
can be used for access control 
policy distribution
PAP, PIP, PRP
Integrated with authentication function If the subject and object can 
be associated with some 
identifications through an 
authentication function.
PIP
Key: Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point (PAP), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), 
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will stay uninterrupted, over 10 seconds the user will lose his/her attention and will 
search for something to work on till the computer responds.
Three time values has been recorded as illustrated in Table 4: real-time, user-time 
and sys-time. In this study, real-time and sys-time have a direct reflect on the perfor-
mance analysis whereas user-time is reflecting the processing outside the kernel. The 
real-time shows the access control execution time in additions to the other OpenStack 
cloud processes that introduce some delay by blocking the process or introducing a 
waiting time. Therefore, this measurement will indicate the effect of our extended 
ABACsh nova to the overall OpenStack system.
The graph in Figure 10 compares the real-time for the three set of experiments. 
The increase is 0.05 seconds when the extended ABACsh nova employ forward 
reasoning in access decision processing as shown in Table 5 while the increase is 
0.145 seconds when ABACsh uses twenty-four attributes in access decision processing. 
Therefore, there is an increase of 0.56% when attributes are added to the policy engine 
and 0.19% when the forward-chaining algorithm is added. Consequently, the increase 
in response time is negligible in Ref. to the usability engineering when the nova 
default access control is extended with part of the proposed ABAC enhancement.
On the other hand, sys-time gives the process execution only within the kernel 
regardless of the other tasks. Therefore, the time for the 25 requests dropped from 
43.02 seconds within real-time to 2.09 seconds within sys-time during Exp1 which 
involve default nova access control. The sys-time comparison for the three experi-
ments is illustrated in Figure 11. The results show a slightly better performance of 
Figure 10. 
Real-time for access control processing in nova.
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5.5% for extending the default nova access control when forward-reasoning has 
been utilized whereas an increase of 4% over the default nova when 24-attributes 
are used in the policy-engine as illustrated in Table 6.
From these results, the ABACsh shows an acceptable performance compared to 
the default OpenStack access control within nova service. This section demonstrates 
the enhanced attribute-based access control ABACsh performance improvement 
when attributes and forward reasoning algorithm are employed. It has been noticed 
that the performance improvement is liner in Figure 10 when only attributes 
are involved in access decision. Whereas in Figure 11 when forward reasoning 
is involved, an improvement in performance has been noticed. This indicates an 
opportunity of enhancing the IaaS-cloud security when logical reasoning and 
AI mechanism are involved in access control system.
5.4.6 Experiments limitations
The main aim of the experiments in this chapter is to study the performance 
improvement when attribute-based access control model is introduced into IaaS 
cloud. The experiment scale is limited to a private cloud in a LAN set-up. Therefore, 
the network performance metrics has not been studied such as the latency and 
throughput. The implementation in this chapter does not involve the PIP compo-
nent of the access control, therefore only a simple forward reasoning algorithm 
has been deployed without knowledge update component. The used database 
for knowledge is written manually whereas the system should use an automated 
information collection method if PIP is implemented. One subject is involved in 
Figure 11. 
Sys-time for access control processing in nova.
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each experiment, therefore multi-access has not been investigated in this chapter. 
Multi-tenant study is a critical future work.
6. Conclusions
This Chapter is focusing on the problem of deploying access control in a 
dynamic environment. Access control is one of the information security principles 
where the system user access is controlled through an access policy. In the cyber-
security world where systems and devices are distributed in different locations, 
there is a need to have an access control model that is able to cope with a dynamic 
environment where new users with different privileges are joining and leaving the 
system.
This chapter is proposing to deploy an enhanced version of attribute-based 
access-control named ABACsh. This model is deploying knowledge base category 
of AI. A proof of concept is implemented in the cloud computing environment to 
measure the performance and the visibility of such a deployment.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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